The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) represents an ideal case study to underscore the importance of institutional analysis. Over the last fifty years, the agency has confronted a regular set of criticisms about its reliance on ex parte communications, its lack of data-driven decisionmaking, and its tendency to act in an ad hoc manner. Nonetheless, the importance of reforming the agency has not risen to the top of the scholarly or public agenda-until recently. In the wake of a series of high-profile criticisms of how the agency operates, the question is now finally shifting to how-and not whether-to reform that agency's institutional processes. This Article highlights the importance of asking that question, explaining how the FCC operates in dysfunctional ways, how it can be reformed, and why this case study highlights an important new frontier for administrative law scholarship. 3 administrative state, this type of inquiry was taken seriously by scholars. 4 Of late, however, it has fallen out of fashion. By highlighting the importance of institutional how administrative agencies actually operate. To make this case, this Article evaluates the institutional failings of the FCC, arguing that they are even more significant than the substantive policy issues superintended by that agency. In so doing, it explains how institutional process can often dictate or distort substantive outcomes.
The institutional failings of the FCC have long escaped attention in both scholarly and popular discussions about the agency. For years, the agency has tolerated a level of mystery and secrecy over what issues it chooses to consider (and what tools it uses to consider them), has relied on the ex parte process at the expense of the formal notice-and-comment procedure, and has engaged in a limited degree of collegial discussion among the Commissioners and the public. The result of such broken procedures is that FCC operates in a dysfunctional fashion and fails to grapple effective with the critical issues it is charged with addressing. After years of neglecting the FCC's institutional flaws, Congress has finally taken an interest in the question of whether and how to reform the FCC's institutional processes. To that end, both House Commerce Committee Chair Emeritus John Dingell and Senate Commerce Committee Chair Jay Rockefeller have expressed serious concerns about how the agency operates, 5 the House Commerce Committee majority released a report citing serious failings in the operations of the agency, 6 and law professor Lawrence Lessig has called for its abolition. MULTICHANNELNEWS, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6524092.html (calling on the Senate to evaluate the "structure of the agency, its mission, the terms of the commissioners, and how to make the agency a better regulator, advocate for consumers, and a better resource for Congress"). 6 lack of data-driven decision-making and its emphasis on political dealing hinders the thoughtfulness of its analysis, limits its ability to address issues effectively, and invites a cynical attitude toward government. 12 This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I briefly describes the longstanding criticisms of how the FCC operates, highlighting a few recent episodes that have drawn attention to the need for institutional reform. Part II discusses the opportunity for the FCC to adopt a new institutional strategy for telecommunications policymaking, emphasizing the importance of strategic agenda setting and transparency. Part III explains how the agency can use its policymaking tools-rulemaking, adjudication, and merger review-more effectively. Part IV underscores the opportunity for the agency to upgrade its collection and dissemination of data as well as its involvement of the public in its decision-making processes. Part V highlights, using the analysis of the FCC as a case study, the need for administrative law scholars to evaluate the importance of institutional structure, competence, and process. Part VI offers a short conclusion.
what's the right doctrine or what's the right conceptual framework has to be applied to questions concerning optimal institutional design and operational arrangements. 2007 , at C1 ("Critics have complained that important issues -such as the 2009 transition to digital television and reforming a fund that subsidizes phone and Internet service for low-income and rural residents -are taking a back seat to bickering."). The often cavalier attitude toward regulation was described and bemoaned by Judge Posner as follows:
There has I think been a tendency of recent Administrations, both Republican and Democratic but especially the former, not to take regulation very seriously. This tendency expresses itself in deep cuts in staff and in the appointment of regulatory administrators who are either political hacks or are ideologically opposed to regulation. (I have long thought it troublesome that Alan Greenspan was a follower of Ayn Rand.) This would be fine if zero regulation were the social desideratum, but it is not. The correct approach is to carve down regulation to the optimal level but then finance and staff and enforce the remaining regulatory duties competently and in good faith. Judging by the number of scandals in recent years involving the regulation of health, safety, and the environment, this is not being done. 
I. BACKGROUND
The FCC is a good case study for how a regulatory commission operates because it oversees an important and large segment of the economy and its operations are deeply flawed, with many claiming that its acronym stands for "from crisis to crisis." In theory, an administrative agency like the FCC should be able to evaluate alternative regulatory strategies and take a holistic perspective on its policymaking mission. In practice, however, the agency is constrained by its practice of viewing issues in isolation without any strategic direction or focus. In some respects, the Commission has adopted the most limiting aspects of the judicial process-reacting mostly to matters that come before it-as well as the most unfortunate aspect of the legislative process-engaging in political deal-making and rewarding those with influence. The challenge for the agency-and for scholars analyzing it-is to evaluate how best to combine the best of both traditions-i.e., drawing on the judiciary's legacy of impartiality and data-driven decision-making and the legislative branch's ability to view issues in a broad and strategic manner. This Part thus first provides some background on how the agency operates, then discusses its political culture, and concludes by highlighting some avenues for institutional reform.
A. THE FCC IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The FCC has long used suboptimal procedures and processes. These failings are not, however, due merely to shortcomings in leadership. As an initial matter, the agency's "public interest" standard is notoriously flexible, open-ended, and susceptible to legislative-like decision-making. 13 Moreover, the agency's operations and institutional habits were shaped by its early statutory assignments. One critical role the FCC traditionally played was making the inherently political judgments of who had the right to use particular radio frequencies. As an historical matter, the agency took as its mandate the need to evaluate which particular firms or individuals were best suited to hold licenses to use the radio spectrum, using comparative hearings to select the best applicant. In some cases, this process was famously used to benefit those with political connectionsincluding then-Congressman Lyndon Johnson's wife 14 -and, in other cases, it led the agency to make judgments about the relative importance to the U.S. economy of different activities (such as livestock breeding as opposed to dairy inspection). 15 In all cases, the agency was limited in its ability to 13 As such, some have questioned the constitutionality of the FCC's statutory mandate. See Randolph J. A second critical and formative role of the FCC was to regulate natural monopolies. This project often entailed an implicit partnership between the regulated parties and the regulator. As former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt put it, the old tradition embraced monopolies "as the best market structures to deliver universal and high quality communications services, such as telephony or video." 17 In the assessment of Judge Posner, this model of regulation involved a cozy relationship between the two parties not necessarily because the regulator was captured or subject to political forces. Rather, as Posner saw it, the regulatory regime allowed (or even encouraged) the interests of the regulator to become intertwined with the conduct of the regulated firm that participated in a program-such as the protection of universal service-that he called "taxation by regulation."
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The FCC's legacy of command-and-control regulation and political favoritism has often steered the agency towards ad hoc judgments and away from any principled framework for evaluating alternative courses of action. Almost forty years ago, FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson summed up this legacy in bemoaning that "[t]oo often decisions are the product of an ad hoc disposition reigning in the absence of any clearly articulated standards for spectrum allocation and utilization priorities."
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In reviewing the spectrum management decisions by the Commission of the 1960s, Johnson offered criticisms that could be made of today's Commission, highlighting "the need to view spectrum problems as a whole; the need to anticipate and plan for future spectrum requirements; and the need to obtain better and more complete data on the use of the spectrum." 20 criticism equally true today, Johnson noted that the FCC generally fails to utilize any of its own insights or independent research, relying "almost exclusively upon information and analysis supplied by" the parties that appear before it.
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The FCC's tendency to engage in ad hoc decision-making-which goes hand-in-hand with a lack of any serious effort at strategic planninghas perennially attracted criticism. In 1949, former President Herbert Hoover-who (as Commerce Secretary) was largely responsible for the establishment of the Federal Radio Commission that evolved into the FCC-led a commission that concluded that the FCC had "failed both to define its primary objectives and to make many policy determinations required for efficient and expeditious administration." 22 In a similar vein, Professor Landis, who helped President Roosevelt develop the basic architecture of the modern administrative state, authored a report for President Kennedy that excoriated the FCC for being "incapable of policy planning, of disposing within a reasonable period of time the business before it, [and] of fashioning procedures that are effective to deal with its problems."
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Despite such criticisms, the FCC's practice of ad hoc decision-making has remained largely intact.
To appreciate the costs of a lack of strategic planning, consider the landmark proceeding that authorized domestic satellites. This proceeding, while seemingly obscure to many of today's observers, led to a revolutionary form of communications that transformed an array of communications technologies (from video programming to cell phones to international voice communications).
As Commissioner Johnson explained, this proceeding did not emerge from a strategic assessment of technological possibilities and how the Commission could advance their development, but rather from a proposal shaped by ABC. Consequently, the FCC approached that matter by heading down the road of granting the request without carefully evaluating the appropriate regulatory strategy. Fortunately, as Johnson described it, "[t]he Ford Foundation subsequently filed a proposal that radically changed the frame of reference in which the question was being discussed-including the concept of a 'people's dividend'" from the massive investment that followed the FCC's decision. 24 That concept, in short, led to proposals for funding the Public Broadcasting Service that, but for the Ford Foundation's intervention, the Commission would have overlooked.
For another case illustrating the costs of the agency's lack of strategic planning and its inability to act proactively, consider the decision to authorize cellular telephone service. The proposal stemmed from a request by AT&T, which sought the sole authority to deploy such a service. Significantly, AT&T's incentive to roll out the service was dulled by its status as a dominant firm evaluating a potentially disruptive technologyi.e., it was skeptical that the technology could succeed, it did not believe there would be a huge market for it, and it worried that wireless services might ultimately pose a threat to its landline operations. 25 Consequently, neither the FCC nor AT&T pushed the matter aggressively, meaning that the authorization was "slow rolled," costing American consumers, on one account, $33 billion in lost productivity gains.
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Flowing in part from the agency's tendency to approach issues in a reactive and ad hoc manner, it also often fails to address them in an intellectually defensible and careful manner. One notable and famous such case arose from the agency's re-evaluation of the financial interest and syndication (finsyn) rules, which restricted the ability of broadcast networks to produce TV programming. Originally, these rules were seen as providing important protections for independent TV producers, but over time, it increasingly appeared that they served to protect the Hollywood studios (which fought for the preservation of the rules) from competition by the networks that were eager to create their own programming development arms. When it decided to keep the rules in place, the FCC wrote a long opinion that Judge Posner, in overturning it on appeal, famously remarked was "like a Persian cat with its fur shaved, [] alarmingly pale and thin."
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To that zinger, he added that " [t] counters that "FCC" stands for "Forever Captured by Corporations." 30 To my mind, the FCC's challenge is not so much the classic portrait of agency capture (e.g., the revolving door) or even the more subtle version of the intertwined interests model (i.e., taxation by regulation) advanced by Posner. Rather, it is the agency's institutional limitations-a failure to approach issues strategically, to develop independent solutions, and anticipate issues ahead of particular crises-that often lead it to miss opportunities to chart independent courses of action like the one identified by the Ford Foundation as to satellite policy. To highlight this issue, Section B discusses three recent case studies in which the agency operated in a highly questionable fashion.
B.
THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE FCC The conduct of administrative regulation at the FCC over the last several years has underscored the political culture described above as well as the institutional failings long cited by critics of the agency. In just the second half of 2007, the process used in three high profile and important proceedings-the open access rules imposed as part of the 700 Megahertz (MHz) auction, the proposed regulations on cable providers based on a finding of adoption of cable services by 70% of consumers, and the media ownership rules-all illustrate the problematic nature of the how the FCC often operates. Taken together, the portrait of agency dysfunction raised by these proceedings make plain the nature of the agency's institutional failings, highlight how it can ultimately undermine the success of policymaking initiatives, and provide a compelling case for institutional reform.
In the summer of 2007, the FCC debated and developed rules for imposing an open access obligation on a wireless provider as part of the auction of valuable "beachfront" wireless spectrum in the 700 MHz band. 31 In stimulating this discussion, however, the FCC failed to suggest publicly that it had any particular proposal in mind, only stating in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) the general possibility that it might take some action along these lines. 32 Subsequent to the issuance of the NPRM, as Cynthia Brumfield described the process, "Chairman Kevin 34 Consequently, the debate over the proposal was hurried and conducted via vague and hard-to-follow ex parte filings after the official notice-and-comment period had ended, resulting in a decision that left open a number of issues for later resolution. 35 The rushed nature of the FCC's deliberation and decision-making process gave rise to a subsequent shadow debate over the scope of the rules after they were formally adopted. In the wake of the agency's decision, some parties apparently saw an opportunity for continued lobbying after the matter had purportedly been decided. Using its Policy Blog as a means of shedding sunlight on this development, Google Telecom Counsel Rick Whitt highlighted this very unorthodox tactic and noted with dismay that "it seems that a 'final' vote by a federal government agency is merely the beginning of a new phase in the process."
36 Ultimately, the FCC declined to change its rules in response to this effort. 37 The second proceeding that merits examination is the effort by to impose a wide-ranging set of prescriptive regulations on cable companies based on highly questionable information. Under the 1992 Cable Act, the FCC is authorized to develop more restrictive regulations of cable television providers if they reach a level of serving 70% of the country and have 70% of subscribers in that territory.
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The first figure was attained many years ago, but the FCC has never suggested that cable providers had reached the second one, generally suggesting that cable penetration reached around 55% of the population (with satellite TV and over-the-air TV serving the rest).
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In compiling its regular report 34 evaluating the multi-channel video programming distribution (MVPD) marketplace, the FCC regularly asked about the reach of cable television providers, but this report was widely viewed as a fact-gathering effort and not as a prelude to adopting regulations.
In the fall of 2007, Chairman Martin proposed that the FCC conclude that the so-called 70/70 threshold had been met. To justify this finding, he suggested that the agency rely on a single source (from a company that later repudiated its own figure) and sought to suppress other relevant information. 40 In so doing, the agency did not use an adjudicative process-or even the formal notice and comment processto generate a factual basis for its actions or to examine the issue. Moreover, in proposing to embark on a new course, Chairman Martin did not even alert his fellow Commissioners (let alone the public) of the specifics of the proposed rule changes or the questions related to the data that underlie them. In fact, as the House Commerce Committee majority report examining the FCC's processes found, "[a]ll of the other data collected in response to the Notice of Inquiry was initially withheld from the other Commissioners, and the career staff was directed not to discuss it with them." 41 To some observers, this tactic merely reflected Chairman Martin's operating style of keeping "his plans tightly wrapped, believing there's a tactical advantage in springing them on other commissioners with little notice." 42 In the case of the proposed regulations for cable providers, the agency ultimately refused to act in a secretive and hurried manner. Notably, in evaluating the relevant information, Commissioner Adelstein (who apparently was the swing vote) reported on the day he voted against the proposed order that: inconceivable that our own data would be cast aside without mention. 43 Moreover, Commissioner Adelstein noted that the process used in that case-a failure to give sufficient notice to the other Commissioners-did not reflect any imperative for immediate action, but was merely a tactical effort to limit the opportunity for discussion and deliberation. 44 A third proceeding that merits notice is the Commission's 2007 evaluation of the media ownership rules. In that case, Chairman Martin detailed his proposal in a press release and a New York Times op-ed (rather than in a Further Notice) only a little over a month before he asked his fellow Commissioners to vote on the proposal. 45 Notably, this release was not only the first time the public heard of the particular proposal, but it was "also the first time the Commissioners were notified of the details." 46 In defense of this tactic, Chairman Martin stated that the FCC was neither required to, nor in the habit of, releasing the text of the proposed rules before voting on them. 47 In the media ownership proceeding, the Commission announced its decision in a twelve-page press release a week before Christmas 2007. 48 At that time, Commissioners Copps and Adelstein both protested the substance and the process used to develop the rules. In particular, Commissioner Copps recounted that the FCC engaged in the last minute charade of pretending to allow input via a public hearing in Seattle (at which 1,100 citizens came with a week's notice) and a last minute notice (after the outcry about the New York Times op-ed) while at the same time rushing to complete and vote on an Order without taking the public's concerns seriously. In a telltale sign of the rushed nature of the proceeding, the process of revising the Order continued right up until the Commission was set to vote on it. As Copps recounted:
Then, last night at 9:44 pm-just a little more than twelve hours before the vote was scheduled to be held and long after the Sunshine period [when comments, even on an "ex parte" basis, can no longer be filed] had begun-a significantly revised version of the Order was circulated. Among other changes, the item now granted all sorts of permanent new waivers and provided a significantlyaltered new justification for the [the relevant rules]. But the revised draft mysteriously deleted the existing discussion of the "four factors" to be considered by the FCC in examining whether a proposed combination was in the public interest. In its place, the new draft simply contained the cryptic words "[Revised discussion to come]." Although my colleagues and I were not apprised of the revisions, USA Today fared better because it apparently got an interview that enabled it to present the Chairman's latest thinking. 49 Finally, in a practice that is all too common at the FCC, the agency did not release its opinion and final rules until almost three months after the vote, 50 leaving affected parties to guess what the actual opinion discussed, allowing a shadow lobbying process to attempt to influence the ultimate opinion after the FCC announced its decision, and raising questions about the legitimacy of its action. In this context, moreover, the delay only underscored that the earlier rushed push for a vote did not reflect any bona fide urgency, but rather was a tactical effort by the Chairman to close a proceeding on his preferred terms.
51
In all three cases described above, the Commission treated the public as irrelevant to its institutional operation. In each case, interested parties (and even some Commissioners) were reduced to reading press reports (based on leaks) to gain insight into the issues before the agency. Commissioner Adelstein decried the agency's approach to regulatory policy in the cable context, stating that " After being told we have to "hurry up" and vote by December 18, the Commission waited over a month and a half before finally issuing this Order. Apparently, it took the majority that long to finalize issues left unresolved at the time we voted. There is no reason we could not have heeded the wishes of many in Congress to take the time needed to work these kinks out before the Commission voted. This is not the way to do rational, fact-based, and public interestminded policy making. It's actually a great illustration of why administrative agencies are required to operate under the constraints of administrative process-and the problems that occur when they ignore that duty. At the end of the day, process matters. Public comment matters. Taking the time to do things right matters. management of the Bay of Pigs episode, which reflected poor planning and a lack of discussion of alternatives, he instituted a far more effective institutional process to manage the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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For an example of how a regulatory agency can change in terms of its operating procedures, consider the case of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Historically, that agency's operating procedures failed to spur deliberation and data-driven decision-making. Thus, after being appointed Chair of the agency, " [Alfred] Kahn criticized what he viewed as an intellectually bankrupt means of doing business-deciding issues in secret, without deliberation, and asking lawyers to develop the necessary justification for a pre-determined result." 57 Reflecting his commitment to transparency and open debate, he systematically changed how the agency operated, starting with a commitment to write orders in understandable prose. Ultimately, however, Kahn's changes at the CAB were short-lived because the agency was dismantled in the 1980s pursuant to the Airline Deregulation Act.
At the Federal Trade Commission, strong leadership and a commitment to sound institutional practices overcame the legacy of an "erratic career" that left the agency vulnerable to mission creep and sailing adrift. 58 In particular, over the last 25 years, the agency has "come back from the brink" and currently operates in an effective manner that has won accolades for its ability to be an effective political entrepreneur and regulator in the Internet age. 59 [A] lawyer on the General Counsel's staff, amply supplied with blank legal tablets and a generous selection of clichés-some, like "beyond-area benefits," "route strengthening" or "subsidy need reduction," tried and true, others the desperate product of a feverish imagination-would construct a work of fiction that would then be published as the Board's opinion. THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 286 (1984) . 58 MCCRAW, supra note 57, at 126-27. 59 As FTC Chairman Bill Kovacic described, the FTC was loathed by Congress in the early 1980s, with one Congressman concluding that it was "'a rogue agency gone insane.'" William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 590 (1982) (quoting Representative William Frenzel). By the time Kovacic wrote his article on the topic, he concluded that the agency was already mending its ways and becoming more effective. Id. at 671 (noting its effective use of, among other things, "planning, research, and preliminary screening"). For a more recent Pitofsky and Tim Muris, both were successful political entrepreneurs who effectively utilized strategic planning and a positive agenda to lead the agency. Both Pitofsky and Muris focused on important opportunities, such as confronting the Internet as an important social and economic force as well as spearheading the enactment of the Do Not Call list regulations. In so doing, they ensured, as Tim Muris put it, that the agency was not merely a "passive observer, swept along by external developments and temporary exigencies."
60 The agency's ability to implement such an agenda and reestablish its value to the nation underscored the wisdom of giving it a second chance to right itself in the midst of calls for it to be shut down on account of its flawed institutional processes and lack of clear-eyed and common sense priorities. 61 For a final example of how an agency can change, consider the case of Ofcom, the UK regulator of the communications industry. Prior to the establishment of Ofcom, observers complained that the operation of one of its predecessor agencies, the Independent Television Commission (ITC), paralleled in some ways how the FCC operates today. As one regulated entity noted:
[I]n terms of getting a fair hearing and in terms of being confident that the regulator has absolutely assessed the merits of the various competing cases, we think Ofcom plays a pretty straight bat, and that was not always the case in the past. At the ITC, there was a tendency for a decision to come out of nowhere and you would not have any forewarning, you would not even know it was an issue for consultation and suddenly it was not just a consultation, it was a decision. 62 By contrast to its legacy means of operation, Ofcom has established itself, in a relatively short period of time (it was founded in 2003), as an "evidence-led" regulator that is committed to the proposition that gathering Thoughtful leadership can help to change an agency's culture and commit to serious strategic thinking and planning. To do so successfully, the agency's leadership must overcome the tendency towards making reactive judgments at both the macro-level-in terms of what issues the agency prioritizes-as well as on the micro-level-how the agency conducts and manages its particular proceedings. With respect to the FCC, it generally does not set forth and commit to a clear agenda of what issues it will prioritize; indeed, when it does address specific issues, it generally seeks to preserve its discretion (to act in an ad hoc manner) by avoiding standards that constrain its policy choices. 64 On the micro-level, the FCC tends to use NPRMs that set forth broad and vague lines of inquiries, giving parties very little guidance on what issues to address while preserving its discretion to proceed in any number of directions. This practice gives a decided advantage to "inside players," who are sophisticated at reading tea leaves, skilled at keeping up with leaks of information, and able to follow the ex parte process, which has long been abused at the FCC. 65 Going forward, the FCC has the opportunity to set a strategic agenda and commit to procedures that ensure a high level of transparency. On the strategic level, the FCC needs to establish a pre-set agenda and begin to undertake overarching evaluations of broad policy such as maximizing the use of spectrum, the impact of market structure (on prices, innovation, and, in the media sector, the availability of local and diverse content), and the use of advanced technology by public safety agencies. 66 All too often, the FCC approaches these topics in an isolated fashion-say, in the context of a merger review or a proceeding involving a band of spectrum-and is forced to invent its entire approach to an issue on the fly. 67 In so doing, the agency 63 Id. at 3. 64 The Landis Report highlights this phenomenon, reporting that "criteria of various different kinds are articulated but they are patently not the grounds motivating decision. No firm decisional policy has evolved from these case-by-case dispositions. Instead the anonymous opinion writers for the Commission pick from a collection of standards those that will support whatever decision the Commission chooses to make." LANDIS, supra note 23, at __. 65 Indeed, in the Landis Report's assessment of administrative agencies, it concluded that the FCC "more than any other agency, has been susceptible to ex parte presentations." LANDIS, supra note 23, at __. 66 Former Chairman Hundt and Greg Rosston suggested a similar approach, albeit one that would also involve the Department of Justice. Hundt & Rosston, supra note 10, at 34. 67 Former FCC Chair Newt Minow claims that this failure is endemic to the multimember commission structure, which drives the practice of "postpon[ing] the improvises on a series of dimensions at once-whether to use a rulemaking or an adjudication to set or refine rules, how to emphasize back-end enforcement versus front-end restrictions, and whether to impose disclosure requirements. The upshot of the FCC's method of decision-making is that it often makes important judgments with limited data, an artificially constrained set of alternatives, and, in many cases, a penchant for delay. 68 As is evidenced in a number of cases (including the ones discussed Part I), this approach produces suboptimal results and leaves both Commission staff and affected parties without a clear sense of the agency's goals or direction. 69 But the impact of the FCC's process is more subtle and insidious than that. Notably, because the agency's flawed processes undermine the ability of investors and entrepreneurs to predict how and when the agency will act, the FCC's institutional processes discourage new firms from developing technologies that depend on FCC decisions (say, as to spectrum regulation). Thus, whereas the poor results that flow from the FCC's flawed processes are sometimes apparent and may be corrected at some point down the road (say, on judicial review), the lack of investment and innovation that ensues from an absence of predictable, expeditious, and reasoned decision-making invariably remains unaddressed and constitutes a loss to the economy and society as a whole.
A.
STRATEGIC AGENDA SETTING policy decision to resolution on a case-by-case basis which all too often means inconsistent decisions with the public and the regulated industry not knowing the ground rules." Minow, supra note 1, at 147. This claim is questionable, however, insofar as other regulatory agencies, such as the SEC and the FTC, do not face this systemic problem despite the need to operate as a collegial body. 68 As noted above, the FCC traditionally relies on the commercial parties for submissions of the relevant data, leaving it hostage to their imagination (or lack thereof) and self-interested objectives. See supra note __ and accompanying text. The Landis Report emphasized this failing, noting that "[l]eadership in the effort to solve problems seems too frequently to be left to commercial interests rather than taken by the Commission itself." Similarly, it concluded that "On major policy matters, the Commission seems incapable of reaching conclusions. To appreciate the overall lack of strategic agenda setting at the FCC, consider the model of regulation used by the European Commission (EC). The EC uses a tripartite process to gather information and engage the public when it formulates its regulatory strategy. First, it encourages its staff members to develop their views and perspectives in working papers, which they release to the public. Second, the agency commissions independent research to inform the agency's own thinking. Finally, it engages the public, opening up what it calls a "consultation," to seek diverse views and perspectives on the relevant issues. Based on this process, the EC is in a position to develop its overarching regulatory strategy for a broad policy area, such as the transition to the next generation of Internet technology and the role for public policy therein. 70 In that context, for example, the EC has set out its specific goals and outlined a timetable for consideration of a number of the relevant issues.
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The EU is hardly alone in using a model of regulatory policymaking that involves considerable up-front analysis and discussion before setting an overarching course. Ofcom, the regulator established in the UK in 2003, has internalized a commitment to strategic policymaking. To that end, it embarks on a series of broad reviews, uses regular consultancies, and issues "Annual Plans" to explain its views on the general regulatory environment and what issues will be addressed going forward. 72 Moreover, in a case closer to home, consider how the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has used a systematic effort to increase its knowledge base on emerging issues 70 such as behavioral advertising. 73 In that context, the agency first identified the issue as part of its set of hearings on "Protecting Consumers in the Next Tech-Ade," where it invited a large number of stakeholders to offer their perspectives. Resulting from that investigation, the FTC hosted a Town Hall on "Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technology." Finally, after an effort by FTC staff to identify a set of principles and issues for resolution, the agency released a document entitled "Online Behavioral Advertising: Moving the Discussion Forward to Possible Self-Regulatory Principles," inviting further comments from stakeholders.
74 By contrast, the FCC generally collapses all three of these steps into a single process that all too often begins with a broad and vague notice and ends with a blizzard of ex parte filings and rules adopted in haste, without sufficient deliberation, public input, or transparency.
It merits note that the model of strategic agenda setting urged here is not completely foreign to the FCC. Such an approach, however, has yet to take hold as part of the agency's culture. 78 as Kennard had begun to do by consolidating the agency's enforcement and public information functions and had envisioned in his framework. 79 Although Powell did not take any transformational steps to align the agency's operations along functional lines, he did take the important step of recognizing the impact of technological convergence by merging the separate Mass Media and Cable Bureaus. Moreover, he appreciated, in principle at least, the importance of setting broad areas of focus and identified six of them-(1) broadband; (2) competition; (3) spectrum; (4) media; (5) public safety and homeland security; and (6) the modernization of the FCC. He did not, however, offer any "meta" strategy for how the agency would approach these policy domains.
In the important area of spectrum reform, Chairman Powell developed a strategic and broad agenda through a process not unlike that used by the EC. In particular, he commissioned the creation of an interdisciplinary task force that drew upon a number of talented public servants at the FCC to think through and broadly re-evaluate the goals of spectrum policy. The Spectrum Policy Task Force report that emerged from that process highlighted a number of important issues for the agency to evaluate and sought to set a pro-active agenda for the agency. 80 Moreover, the Task Force's work and its effort to identify relevant proceedings in a comprehensive and coherent manner markedly distinguished the treatment of that area from other priorities of the agency.
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To underscore the point, consider that the only other one of the six priorities noted above where the agency displayed a hint of broad strategic thinking was public safety and homeland security, where it adopted (in 2003) a twopage action plan to govern its efforts.
82
Under Chairman Martin, the broad goals identified by Chairman Powell were kept in place, but the broad project of spectrum reform as identified by the Task Force report was essentially abandoned without any 83 In so doing, the agency left spectrum policy issues to once again be addressed on an ad hoc basis-i.e., without the benefit of any overarching commitment to resolve particular issues, a more developed empirical and theoretical framework for regulatory policy, or any commitment to communicating to the public the agency's perspective on those issues. 84 Reflecting the frustration that telecommunications issues are not guided by any overarching agenda and thus appear on (and disappear from) the agency's agenda without apparent reason or warning, some commentators have complained that the FCC is "the worst communicator in Washington." The FCC's lack of transparency operates on a number of levels. First, when the agency announces a rulemaking, it rarely suggests specific rules and sometimes does not even ask specific questions for parties to address. Second, the FCC's notice-and-comment processes are often a meaningless precursor to the "real" discussion that occurs during the socalled ex parte process, where parties file short statements that, at least often in practice, do not set out the full extent of oral discussions. This unofficial opportunity for comment, which is not regulated by any legal framework and generally is available only to those well connected to the 83 84 To be sure, strategic planning should not involve a mechanistic or formalistic commitment to addressing particular issues at pre-determined times, but it should provide for a self-conscious commitment to publicly identified priorities. As the Chair of the U.K. Chair of the Office of Fair Trading explained, strategic planning "cannot be too rigid and it cannot be too binding. Finally, when the FCC announces its adoption of an order, it often does so without releasing the actual text, raising questions as to what the agency actually voted on and what happens between the so-called vote and the final issuance of the order-which can take place many months later. I will discuss how and why the FCC needs to reform each of these shortcomings.
In terms of managing its rulemakings, the FCC has gotten into the habit of commencing wide-open proceedings that do not propose specific rules. Consequently, the FCC generally leaves parties with the challenge of guessing what issues are really important-or reserving their energies and resources until the ex parte process when that might become clear. Technically speaking, this practice does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, as that law only specifies that NPRMs must include "a description of the subjects or issues involved." 87 Practically speaking, however, this practice undermines the opportunity for meaningful participation and effective deliberation.
To appreciate the real world impact of the FCC's practice, consider the case of a recent initiative to impose requirements on local radio stations to compile playlists and community outreach efforts. 88 The basic idea behind the proceeding-to develop more information related to how radio stations operate-was a noble one (see Part III, below), but the way it was conducted deprived the public and affected parties of key information that could have informed their participation and feedback. In that case, radio lobbyists were left scrambling to find out relevant details about the specific proposal, such as who would have to submit such reports and how often. 90 Puzzanghera, supra note __ suggestions on any topic it envisions addressing to set the stage for public comment. If the agency engages in the strategic planning effort suggested above, disclosing more relevant details at the outset of proceedings should flow naturally. Notably, releasing the proposed rules up front is the common practice for many other agencies; 91 for the FCC, however, it constitutes the exception. This places the FCC far outside the norm of most agencies, which release notices that "routinely contain the full text of the rule as well as lengthy preambles, including the information, data, and analyses upon which the agency relied." 92 If the FCC persists in opening proceedings with only a general description of the relevant issues, it has two options for providing sufficient notice and enabling effective deliberation. First, it could begin with a Notice of Inquiry, which is designed to elevate the agency's understanding of an issue and not to generate binding rules. Alternatively, if it does use an NPRM with a limited disclosure of the issues that ultimately emerge as important, it should issue a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, as the agency recently did in the so-called D Block proceeding (which was designed to facilitate the emergence of a private-public partnership for public safety communications).
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As for the ex parte process, the agency's commitment to greater transparency as to what issues are up for discussion at the commencement of a rulemaking will limit the need and opportunity for a heavy reliance on ex parte communications. In any event, the agency needs to take seriously the value of a reasonable level of disclosure when ex parte meetings take place. Indeed, in some cases, the general disclosures in the filings that accompany such meetings verge on the comedic. Take, for example, a filing by Alltel that stated merely that company officials met with a few FCC staff persons "to share our thoughts" on a particular proceeding. 94 This sort of filing has repercussions for the parties themselves insofar as their desire to keep their presentations secret is at odds with the legal requirement to make "a record" of their objection in order to pursue them on appeal. are up for discussion at particular points in time has contributed to an environment that, as the GAO put it, enables "stakeholders with advance information about which rules are scheduled for a vote to know when it is most effective to lobby the FCC, while stakeholders without this information would not." 95 The current system of ex parte filings that are devoid of content not only undermines informed deliberation of the relevant issues, but also precludes the opportunity for meaningful judicial review. 96 To be sure, the penalty placed on parties deprived of judicial review provides some incentive not to engage in the prevailing practice, but the culture of secrecy retains a powerful hold on those engaged in the ex parte process. Consequently, the appropriate remedy is a fundamental reform of how the agency operates, including not merely ending the use of vague NPRMs, but also requiring agency officials (as opposed to lobbyists) to be responsible for filing the document that captures the relevant discussions (as many other agencies require).
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The abuse of the ex parte process is exacerbated by two features of FCC proceedings that are under the agency's control-(1) the length of its proceedings; and (2) the lack of a well-developed and evidence-based record. First, if the FCC could manage its proceedings with an eye to how issues are developed and commit, as a general strategy, to open a Further NPRM after a certain interval, it would elevate the importance of "official" filings-as opposed to placing the real weight on ex parte filings. One option, suggested by a few commentators, is to institute a "shot clock" that would require agency action within a prescribed period of time. 98 Rather than impose a procedure that would artificially rush resolution of difficult issues, however, the agency should institute the norm that it will conduct 95 GAO, FCC SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO RULEMAKING INFORMATION 4 (2007) , available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071046.pdf. In response to the GAO's stinging report-which criticized the FCC's ex parte process on the ground that well-connected lobbyists can gain crucial information and insights about its processes not available to others-the FCC committed to post on its website all items that are circulating for a decision. 96 In a costly example of this phenomenon at work, Sprint was prevented from challenging certain FCC rules that might require it to vacate valuable spectrum because the company had failed to make its arguments in ex parte filings with sufficient specificity to be preserved for appellate review. proceedings in a timely manner and embarrass itself when it does notprominently listing on its website the pending proceedings, how long they have remained unresolved, and the status of the record. 99 Second, if the FCC would, as discussed below, use Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) to conduct proceedings and develop an evidentiary record through open testimony under oath, it could radically change the agency's culture. In particular, once an ALJ published proposed findings of fact for evaluation by the Commission, the discussion would center on a relevant set of issues grounded in empirical data, ending the guesswork that drives much of the ex parte process for those who are not well-connected lobbyists. Third, as discussed below, the FCC could commission and publish independent research to inform its deliberations and highlight the relevant issues for discussion.
Finally, as to the FCC's procedure for adopting rules, the agency needs to commit to issuing its written opinions on the day the decision is announced. At present, many high profile matters are decided when the actual written opinion has yet to be finalized. As for what the agency does during this time, one commentator suggested that the opinions that are actually voted on do not reflect "well-reasoned statements of principle," but rather are a "patchwork of pieces" that must be stitched together after the decision is announced, often requiring substantive redrafting.
III. TOWARDS PRINCIPLED AND COLLEGIAL DECISION-MAKING
A critical challenge facing the FCC is how to evaluate more carefully how and when to use notice-and-comment rulemaking, adjudication, and merger review proceedings as strategies for making policy decisions. In all three contexts, the agency often takes procedural shortcuts that avoid engaging in true data development and evaluation. To highlight the failings in each context and the need for a more well-thought out strategy of how they should each be used, this Article discusses one example of each, and presents a number of different possible reforms.
A. NOTICE AND COMMENT RULEMAKING
The theory of notice-and-comment rulemaking is that an agency can use this process to develop its policy judgments. The weakness of this 99 To appreciate the need and cause for such embarrassment, consider that it is not unheard of for the FCC to leave proceedings languishing for longer than a decade. process is that it does not provide the agency with an effective avenue for developing an empirical basis for and understanding of the issues involved in a regulatory policy domain. As Judge Posner explained in observing the agency's handling of the finsyn rules, "[t]he nature of the record compiled in a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding-voluminous, largely self-serving commentary uncabined by any principles of reliability, let alone by the rules of evidence-further enlarges the Commission's discretion and further diminishes the capacity of the reviewing court to question the Commission's judgment."
101 Indeed, the appeal of using a procedure that can lead to "a cooking the books," as Commissioner Adelstein noted as to one rulemaking, 102 leads the FCC to rely almost exclusively on the paper record of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process and the use of the opaque ex parte process as a means of focusing in on its conclusions.
To appreciate the value of a process focused on data-driven analysis, consider the FCC's recent development of a location mandate for E-911 calls made from wireless phones. At a high level of generality, there was a consensus that facilitating better access to this information for public safety answering points (PSAPs) was an important public policy goal. In conducting the proceeding, however, the FCC used some of the same tactics noted above, seeking to impose greater specificity as to the location accuracy that wireless providers must share with PSAPs after a rushed comment period process and on the basis of an ex parte proposal that was subject to no public comment and no agency deliberation.
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In dissenting from the E911 location Order, Commissioner Adelstein noted that "while I support providing first responders with the best data possible, today's item is fraught with highly dubious legal and policy maneuvering that bypasses a still developing record on what should be the reasonable and appropriate implementation details." 104 In particular, Commissioner Adelstein added that:
Given the huge commitment of resources and effort needed to make the vast progress we have yet to make, a collaborative, cooperative approach is the most effective way to achieve the goals all of us share. Adopting in whole cloth an eleventh hour proposal at the stroke of Sunshine's end is not the way to promote an atmosphere for progress. Instead of working with all stakeholders, the Commission today simply adopts on a Tuesday a proposal filed on Friday. Offering no opportunity for deliberation or participation by so many stakeholders does not befit an expert agency.
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In highlighting the FCC's questionable conduct, Adelstein noted that the agency should not have rushed to a decision on a paper record, but rather should have taken advantage of workshops and collaborative forums to reach a solution that all parties, at least in principle, were committed to reaching.
106 Ultimately, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau acknowledged that the Order was overly aggressive and imposed a stay, 107 prompting Commissioner Adelstein to highlight that the earlier decision to plow "forward with [mandating] compliance benchmarks without a full record, rather than conducting this proceeding in a more thoughtful and deliberate manner, [did] not truly advance E911."
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Rulemaking proceedings conducted on a paper record can serve a useful function. They are not, however, the right tool for all regulatory policy challenges. Moreover, they need to be used in a more strategic context-relying on developed knowledge and allowing for informed deliberation-to be successful public policymaking tools. Notably, rulemakings need not be viewed as either/or tools to the use of adjudication, but can actually follow from and be informed by adjudication. Finally, rulemakings must be managed with appropriate oversight-neither rushing issues to a premature judgment nor allowing them to linger without any resolution.
B. ADJUDICATIONS, ENFORCEMENT, AND THE USE OF ALJS
The FCC so seldom uses adjudicative processes that some observers overlook the fact that the agency is authorized to use them at all. Indeed, when the agency conducts an adjudication, the process looks nothing like traditional adjudicatory processes. After all, the FCC often provides no opportunity for discovery, the submission of evidence under oath, the open selection of witnesses, or cross-examination. Consider, for example, the recent Comcast case involving that company's network management processes. 110 In that case, the FCC styled the proceeding as an adjudication even though it did not use any judicial-like process-i.e., the actual proceeding mirrored the agency's rulemaking processes noted above. Indeed, that proceeding once again evoked the all too familiar complaints by dissenting Commissioners that they were forced to vote on an Order without the benefit of sufficient time to evaluate its substance.
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The FCC's management of the Comcast case in a fashion more akin to a rulemaking should not surprise observers of the agency. After all, the FCC only employs two ALJs and they rarely are given assignments to handle adjudicative proceedings.
Indeed, when ALJs are given assignments-as occurred recently with a case involving a dispute between the NFL Network and Comcast-the FCC often maintains a high level of involvement and micromanagement of the proceeding, thereby undermining the ALJ's authority. 112 As for the Enforcement Bureau, its processes are often managed with a level of political oversight and a lack of commitment to neutral determination of complaints. Consequently, it is not empowered to act effectively on complaints and has failed, according to a GAO report, to resolve many of them or explain why no action was taken.
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Going forward, the FCC has an important opportunity to invigorate its enforcement program and use it in a more strategic matter. As for enforcement, the FCC needs to develop the capability to enforce its rules in a credible manner so that it can, in appropriate instances, shift from its legacy focus on restricting what parties can do before-the-fact to evaluating the impact of actual behavior after-the-fact. In the case of spectrum policy, for example, the FCC's legacy orientation means that spectrum licensees are restricted in how they can use their spectrum so that they avoid even the 110 theoretically possible creation of interference-as opposed to making a showing that they created interference in practice. 114 To be sure, the FCC has experimented with the model of allowing greater front-end flexibility in return for after-the-fact oversight, 115 but this approach is the exception. To appreciate the limited development of the FCC's enforcement processes, consider the longstanding complaints that satellite radio providers were violating the terms of their licenses. In particular, as Commissioner Tate put it, Sirius Satellite Radio "failed to complyknowingly and repeatedly-with the specifications for its FM modulators and the terms of its Special Temporary Authorizations ("STAs") for more than five years." 116 In the face of this problem, one might suspect the FCC had conducted a vigorous enforcement proceeding. That belief, however, would be mistaken. In fact, the FCC only took action and entered into a consent decree with the two companies once they were on the brink of receiving approval to merge with one another. Consequently, as a condition of receiving approval to merge, XM agreed to a "voluntary contribution" of $17,394,375 and Sirius agreed to one of $2,200,000.
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The FCC's failure to treat seriously the longstanding complaints about Sirius and XM's behavior is emblematic of the agency's lack of commitment to effective enforcement. In failing to enforce its rules effectively and reliably, the FCC both undermines a commitment to rule-oflaw values and sometimes ends up making accommodations to parties who violated rules that were not previously enforced. 118 Ideally, the FCC would, in such cases, authorize the Enforcement Bureau to bring cases before ALJs to develop the necessary factual record to either make the entry of consent decrees a meaningful law enforcement act (as opposed to a political negotiation 119 ) or lead to an adjudicated decision. In practice, however, the FCC almost never uses its ALJs and, according to its website, its ALJs have 114 For a discussion of this issue, see Philip J. Weiser 120 In fact, the ALJs are reportedly kept busy by being loaned out to the Social Security Administration.
The promise of using ALJs is readily apparent when one evaluates how state agencies manage telecommunications policymaking. In many cases, state public utility commissions are able to use ALJs to hear evidence and create a well developed factual basis for the agency's deliberations. 121 Indeed, in some states, the "ALJs are more independent than state appellate or trial court judges."
122 In using ALJs, state commissions (and federal ones like the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) separate the trial staff so that they do not interact with the staff persons who advise the commission in its role as adjudicator.
In conceiving of the appropriate role for ALJs, it is important to appreciate that they need not be used to decide matters of regulatory policy per se. Rather, they can merely be asked to determine the relevant facts, which is their comparative advantage. Take, for example, the Comcast decision, where the FCC attempted, using a paper record, to evaluate what types of network management techniques Comcast used. In so doing, the FCC relied on the self-serving and unexamined statements presented in that process and reached a judgment vulnerable to the criticism offered by Commissioner McDowell: "[t]he truth is, the FCC does not know what Comcast did or did not do." 123 The FCC could instead have referred the matter to an ALJ to render a set of proposed factual findings pursuant to established procedures that would have enabled the agency to better understand the relevant facts and make a more informed policy judgment.
In contemplating a role for ALJs, it is important to recognize that this model can be implemented in more or less effective ways. At the FTC, for example, the use of administration adjudication can undermine that 120 Office of Administrative Law Judges, http://www.fcc.gov/oalj (last visited Dec. 19, 2008 The evidence in the record is thin and conflicting. All we have to rely on are the apparently unsigned declarations of three individuals representing the complainant's view, some press reports, and the conflicting declaration of a Comcast employee. The rest of the record consists purely of differing opinions and conjecture.
Id.
agency's effective and expeditious resolution of disputes when personnel rules prevent the agency from using ALJs with relevant expertise in antitrust or consumer behavior. 124 To address this issue, the agency has recently proposed new rules to expedite the process, has experimented with using Commissioners to sit as ALJs (although that raises questions about prejudging issues), and has asked Congress to allow it to select ALJs with relevant experience. 125 Nonetheless, even assuming that the FTC improves its administrative litigation process, some have leveled the more fundamental criticism of this model of decision-making that it often leads to the pre-ordained results sought by the FTC. 126 This cautionary concern, to the extent it counsels against administrative litigation in the FTC context, is far less applicable in the FCC context where "cooking the books" is already an endemic concern as to its rulemaking processes. Consequently, the effective use of ALJs by the FCC promises to improve the quality of its policymaking process because it would provide the agency with a more rigorous factual understanding of the relevant issues than can be obtained by sorting through a paper record to identify the salient facts.
C. MERGER REVIEWS
The third principal type of policy-making vehicle used by the FCC is merger review proceedings. Technically speaking, these proceedings are adjudications, but practically speaking, they are often negotiations where the FCC seeks to leverage its authority to approve the merger to obtain concessions that often have little or nothing to do with the competitive issues raised by the transaction. 127 In his criticism of this process, former Chairman Powell noted that it "places harms on one side of a scale and then collects and places any hodgepodge of conditions-no matter how ill-suited to remedying the identified infirmities-on the other side of the scale." 128 Thus, unlike the Justice Department, the FCC does not make any effort to ensure that there is "a significant nexus between the proposed transaction, the nature of the competitive harm, and the proposed remedial provisions."
129 But because the very nature of the proceeding involves "voluntary" concessions, this type of action is outside the scope of judicial review.
In conducting its merger reviews, the FCC often engages in a form of the rushed judgments that it makes at the end of a rulemaking proceeding. Consider, for example, the review of the merger between AOL and Time Warner in 2001. 130 In that case, the FCC evaluated whether it should impose an interoperability mandate on AOL's instant messaging service (AIM). In so doing, the agency not only failed to analyze the connection of the remedy to the merger, but it cursorily concluded that it had the authority to regulate in an area outside its traditional mandate. Notably, the FCC concluded that instant messaging and "AOL's [names and presence database] are subject to our jurisdiction under Title I of the Communications Act."
131 As then-Commissioner Powell pointed out in dissent, it was questionable for the FCC to reach such a judgment in haste, as "such a grand conclusion should only be reached after very careful and thoughtful deliberations and full comment by a wide range of interested parties [.] " 132 As to the merits of the FCC's action, there were serious questions at the time that its decision was flawed on competition policy grounds. 133 The passage of two years revealed as much and the FCC decided to remove the condition.
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A second flaw in the FCC's use of its merger authority is that the willingness of applicants to negotiate "voluntary conditions" facilitates the agency's tendency to make decisions in an ad hoc manner. Despite the fact that such conditions only apply to the merging parties, the FCC sometimes uses such proceedings to decide issues that are otherwise pending in industry rulemakings-leading to one set of rules for those who have 129 merged and another set of rules for similarly situated parties who have not. Consider, for example, the issue of whether local telephone companies should be required to provide "naked DSL" (i.e., DSL service without providing a telephone line). Rather than address the issue in an industrywide rulemaking, the FCC used the pendency of two merger proceedings involving the largest telephone companies (AT&T and Verizon) to impose such a requirement on them alone. 135 Similarly, with respect to network neutrality, the FCC had originally suggested that its Internet policy statement was non-binding; 136 nonetheless, when SBC and Verizon proposed to merge with AT&T and MCI, respectively, the FCC imposed a condition that the companies agree to abide by follow those principles.
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In urging that the agency not operate in this fashion, then-Commissioner Abernathy highlighted that "the customary administrative weaponry in the Commission's arsenal-rulemaking, enforcement, and so on-does not suddenly evaporate once a merger is approved."
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The final flaw that often inheres in the FCC's merger review process is the agency's practice of accepting a variety of "voluntary conditions" that it later declines to enforce. Consider, for example, the FCC's decision to condition the merger between SBC and Ameritech on, among other things, SBC's commitment to entering into thirty markets outside of its region.
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The sheer ambition of enforcing such a commitment begs so many questions-what constitutes "real entry," is a transitory entry sufficient, etc.-that it did not surprise seasoned observers of the agency that there was little or no follow-through on enforcing the commitment. Nonetheless, the agency continues to impose a variety of conditions that are far from self-executing and are outside its normal regulatory mandates, doing so most recently in the merger of XM and Sirius, where the agency imposed a series of conditions ranging from an "a la carte" mandate to a requirement 135 to provide non-commercial channels. 140 Despite the request of some parties that the agency adopt a specific enforcement mechanism to ensure that such requirements are followed, 141 the FCC declined to do so, suggesting that, once again, the past may well be prologue in terms of enforcing merger conditions. I do not believe that the FCC's merger review processes are invariably and necessarily dysfunctional and that they can only be remedied by stripping the agency of such authority altogether. To be sure, this view is plausible and pressed by former Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, among others. 142 This position, however, overlooks that there are successful cases of FCC merger review and the agency's oversight of mergers can be a productive part of the policymaking process. 143 Consider, for example, the FCC's review of the News Corp./DirecTV merger. In the case, the agency stuck to devising competition policy remedies that were necessitated by the merger. 144 Notably, the Justice Department concluded in that case that the FCC's action "addresse[d] the Department's most significant concerns with the proposed transaction[]" and the FCC's action justified its decision to close its investigation. 145 In imposing a set of conditions as part of clearing the merger, the FCC did not adopt a standalone regime that it would be unlikely to enforce, but rather imposed a set of requirements that were harmonized with its existing regulatory requirements. 146 Finally, as for the rules imposed as part of the merger that had no counterpart in the FCC's regulatory requirements, the agency developed a special procedure of the kind it declined to adopt in the XM/Sirius matter-i.e., it instituted an arbitration regime with appeal to the Commission.
IV. TOWARD DATA-DRIVEN DECISION-MAKING
The FCC has yet to develop a model of generating information and insights that can inform its policy-making agenda. This Part outlines how the agency could seek to obtain better information, elicit more effective public input, and, finally, enable the public to play a more constructive role in the agency's work. First, it highlights the importance of commissioning and publishing research that underlies its conclusions. Second, it calls for a more effective partnership with other resources that can provide valuable analysis and insight. Third, it makes the case for a more self-conscious strategy for developing sources of data. Finally, it explains that there are a number of strategies the agency could use to involve the public in its decisionmaking.
A. A COMMITMENT TO INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
The FCC rarely commissions, supports, and uses truly independent research in its policymaking activities. Over the last several years, this tendency has eroded both the intellectual credibility and legal validity of the agency's rules. To address this failing, the FCC must commit to seeking out relevant sources of data and engaging in data-driven analysis as well as ending its habit of relying on single points of data that, in many cases, it avoids sharing for analysis and criticism. In so doing, the FCC should reestablish the tradition of an empowered Chief Economist and Chief Technologist, both of whom should be essential parts of an Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis (OSPPA) that develops published working papers to inspire constructive discussions and farsighted analysis. In recent years, both positions have been filled only sporadically and very few OSPPA working papers have been published. Worse yet, employees often were afraid that those who "express an opinion, even if based on fact" would be "demoted, reassigned, or hounded out of the agency" if the opinions articulated differed from a pre-set agenda.
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To begin on a positive note, it merits appreciation that two of the FCC's signature achievements over the last forty years emerged from independent research commissioned from outside of the agency. First, consider the case of the Computer I decision, 149 where the FCC sought to protect competition in the data processing industry and keep it free of regulation. To develop its rules in that case, the FCC contracted with the Stanford Research Institute to analyze the comments and develop a proposal for the agency's regulatory strategy. Similarly, in the case of the Part 68 rules, 150 which facilitated competition in the equipment market and ended the almost decade-long effort by AT&T to avoid the letter and spirit of the Carterphone decision, 151 the FCC contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to define the relevant interface to the public switched telephone network for terminal equipment. In both cases, the FCC's regulations were upheld by the courts and were a huge success in practice.
The Computer I decision is a remarkable FCC decision and an important guide to policymakers for a number of reasons. First, the agency examined in that case an issue in a pro-active fashion and sought independent analysis to guide its judgment. Second, the decision reflected a commitment to considering the interests of the innovator who was not before the Commission in the particular proceeding. (The same praise is owed to the FCC's extension of the Part 15 rules to authorize the use of spread spectrum, ultimately leading to the development of wi-fi technology.
152 ) Finally, the FCC engaged in ongoing reassessment of the effects of the decision, ultimately revising it as the agency evaluated the relevant economic issue and technological changes.
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Over the last several years, the FCC has encountered increasing judicial hostility and criticism for its management of research related to its decisions. Consider, for example, the FCC's Broadband over Powerline decision.
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That ruling sought to move to an after-the-fact model of spectrum management, thereby evaluating interference between different users in practice rather than in theory. This effort to generate more real world data emerged from a flawed FCC decision-making process whereby the agency failed to make public the initial spectrum measurements that informed its judgment that this change in regulatory strategy was appropriate. Consequently, the D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC's decision, underscoring that the Administrative Procedure Act requires that agencies make public "the 'technical studies and data' upon which the agency relies" to establish binding regulations. 155 In so doing, the D.C. Circuit revealed some of its impatience with the FCC's operating practices, noting that "[i]t would appear to be a fairly obvious proposition that studies upon which an 150 agency relies in promulgating a rule must be made available during the rulemaking in order to afford interested persons meaningful notice and an opportunity for comment[]"
156 and that "the Commission can point to no authority allowing it to rely on the [unpublished] studies in a rulemaking but hide from the public parts of the studies that may contain contrary evidence, inconvenient qualifications, or relevant explanations of the methodology employed."
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The last two media ownership proceedings revealed a similar missed opportunity to generate, evaluate, and utilize thoughtful research. In the 2003 effort to evaluate the optimal regulatory strategy for restricting media ownership, the FCC sought to develop a "Diversity Index" to structure its regulation of the broadcast industry.
158 When the agency adopted its rules, it failed to provide parties a sufficient opportunity to scrutinize and provide feedback about the scope and nature of the Diversity Index. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the FCC in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 159 highlighting that:
As the Diversity Index's numerous flaws make apparent, the Commission's decision to withhold it from public scrutiny was not without prejudice. As the Commission reconsiders its Cross-Media Limits on remand, it is advisable that any new "metric" for measuring diversity and competition in a market be made subject to public notice and comment before it is incorporated into a final rule. 160 The FCC's latest media ownership rulemaking (discussed above) did not heed this counsel and essentially repeated the mistake made in its earlier proceeding. In particular, the agency not only did not endeavor to rest its decision on more supportable grounds, it actually ignored the research that the agency itself was developing. As Mark Cooper described the most recent proceeding:
In its haste, the new research agenda devoted little attention to defining and operationalizing the goals of the Communications Act. This tunnel vision ignored efforts by the FCC to understand its policy goals in the period after the court remanded its new media ownership rules. The new agenda led to results-driven research projects. Simply put, the Commission started from the result it wanted and worked backwards. 161 In light of the judicial responses to failed FCC processes in the BPL and media ownership cases discussed above, some might argue that the necessary incentives for institutional reform are present and, in any event, the judiciary is capable of compensating for the FCC's institutional failings. This view, however, overstates greatly the impact of judicial review. Notably, many rulemakings vulnerable to the concerns highlighted abovesuch as an overreliance on the ex parte process-do not necessarily raise a ground for reversal. 162 More fundamentally, many of the institutional failings discussed above often lead to agency inaction that, even when subject to correction through the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, can only be addressed many years (and even a decade) after the fact. 163 Consequently, the impetus for institutional reform will need to come either from the agency itself or Congress.
B. AN EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTAL, ACADEMIC, AND INDUSTRY RESOURCES
Over the last several years, the FCC has sought to go it alone. Considering that it regulates an industry in which technological change is exploding and in which a wide variety of stakeholders can provide the agency with valuable insights and information, this strategy is misguided. In the years ahead, the agency should seek to engage an array of entities that can enable it to operate more effectively.
First, the agency should re-engage other governmental agencies, non-profit organizations, and academic institutions. With respect to other governmental agencies, it merits note that there are a number of notable agencies with scientific and technical capabilities with whom the FCC could and should seek more frequent cooperation, including the Commerce Department laboratories and the standard setting expertise at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST the FCC's abandonment of the State and Local Government Advisory Committee and its lack of relationship with State CIOs both greatly hamper its effectiveness in areas ranging from broadband policy to public safety communications. As for non-profit and academic organizations, the agency can, both by reaching out to them, taking their research more seriously, and seeking to generate data that can enable independent research, enlist them as partners in elevating the level of analysis of critical communications policy issues.
In terms of the private sector, the FCC has a number of opportunities to enlist expertise it is currently leaving untapped. For starters, the agency should once again activate the Technical Advisory Committee that, when it was active, was a valuable sounding board on both broad strategic issues and specific tactical ones. 164 As Russell J. Lefevre, president of IEEE-USA, put it, "[d]espite the generally excellent nature of its internal staff, given all of the technical issues within the FCC's jurisdiction, it may be prudent to seek means to supplement the internal technical capabilities of the Commission." 165 
C.
COLLECTING AND SHARING DATA WITH THE PUBLIC
To facilitate data-driven decision-making, the FCC must develop a more coherent and comprehensive commitment to collecting relevant data. At present, the agency lacks the most basic data about how the wireless spectrum is being used and where broadband services are available, for example. Moreover, the agency has failed to make the information it does have in an easily accessible form that can invite outside parties to analyze it and remix it in interesting ways. This failing is not just a missed opportunity. Rather, it fundamentally undermines the agency's ability to execute on its mission. With respect to the prices paid for high capacity lines by businesses (so-called "special access pricing"), for example, the GAO excoriated the FCC's lack of data that, as it put it, is necessary to determine whether the agency's "deregulatory policies are achieving their goals." 166 In short, the FCC has not developed an effective strategy either for collecting data or distributing it.
On the broadband front, there are huge opportunities for the FCC's data collection efforts to play an important role in public policy development. To date, the FCC has abdicated that responsibility, setting up a measurement regime in 1998 (which defined broadband as "200 kilobits" and measured availability by whether anyone in a zip code has broadband service) and leaving that system unchanged for a decade. 168 In the absence of FCC leadership on this front, different states took up the mantle of broadband policy, emphasizing the importance of broadband measurement and mapping and proceeding without the benefit of federal guidance or support. 169 Just recently, Congress unanimously passed the Broadband Data Improvement Act, requiring the FCC to take such a leadership role in this area. 170 In addition to evaluating the extent of broadband deployment, the FCC could also help to more clearly define level of broadband service and educate consumers in broadband markets as to what they should expect from their provider. 171 Today, for example, no effective disclosure regime exists to make clear what degree of "latency" (or delay) exists in broadband networks or what "up to 1 megabit per second" really means. With a better understood disclosure regime in place, providers would be pressured to compete more vigorously along quality dimensions (as opposed to merely price). Indeed, competition for lower calorie, lower sodium, or lower fat foods only emerged once an understandable disclosure regime for nutritional information was developed and implemented. 172 The FCC's decision to end the collection of some quality measures in telephone markets suggests a lack of appreciation for the point that, especially in competitive markets, sunlight on the services offered by providers is even more important. In making this decision, the FCC concluded that the absence of similar obligations on other carriers rendered the legacy regime suspect. 173 In short, this Order moved in the wrong direction. The right question is how can the agency develop a systematic portrait of the marketplace so that its data collection efforts are accurate, can inform consumers, and can enable data-driven policymaking in a sound and prudent manner. 174 On the wireless spectrum front, it is widely appreciated that spectrum is both a valuable and underused resource. One challenge in facilitating the development of a robust secondary market is that many would-be lessors of spectrum licenses do not know who to contact. Thus, an initial challenge for the FCC is to establish a user-friendly spectrum registry that identifies the different bands of spectrum, a contact person, and stated terms for leasing access to spectrum.
175 By posting this information, the FCC would not produce widespread disclosure of nutritional information until federal regulation required it. It was the regulation that created a market for nutritional information that now appears to be strong. enable entrepreneurs, policymakers, and ordinary citizens to evaluate both potential policy reforms and new business strategies.
In developing new databases of information, it is not sufficient merely to make them available to the public-the FCC also should enable citizens to manipulate information and use it in creative ways. 176 At present, unfortunately, the FCC databases are not only difficult to search, but they do not give citizens the opportunity to use that data and make connections between different data sets-say, broadband deployment and job creation. Consequently, the agency has failed to spur what one commentator calls "wikinomics"-i.e., enabling user-generated content. 177 This trend is just now taking root, as groups of ordinary citizens are combining information related to a variety of topics, ranging from crime rates in Chicago neighborhoods and L.A. communities at risk of fire violations, using technologies like Google Maps to make interesting connections. 178 Over the last several years, the FCC has often viewed the job of engaging the public as a chore, not a responsibility and opportunity. Significantly, the public should not merely be viewed as interested and informed consumers-say, individuals interested in the best opportunities to purchase broadband connections-but also engaged citizens. Improving the transparency of how the agency operates, upgrading its website to make it more usable, and involving the public in data collection on matters ranging from spectrum use to broadband deployment are all important steps. But such steps must also be followed up with efforts to engage the public.
In soliciting public engagement, the FCC should seek to find ways of getting feedback that is most conducive to shaping regulatory policy. Consider, for example, the difference between a short email expressing an opposition to media consolidation as opposed to a more developed reaction to a specific proposal. To be sure, a large number of emails expressing a basic level of opposition to a particular course of action provide a very valuable signal. To help justify its action, however, the agency must develop well reasoned arguments, ranging from ones offered at hearings where information is first presented to citizen panels where individuals can deliberate on issues like a jury and offer their views as a body.
V. TOWARD A NEW PROJECT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The failings of the FCC are not unique among administrative agencies. Administrative law scholars, however, have rarely evaluated the nuts and bolts of how administrative agencies themselves operate, preferring to address the substantive legal questions they address or the legal issues involved in reviewing agency decision-making. Thus, for every one hundred articles addressing one aspect or another of the Chevron doctrine, there is perhaps one article-if that many-evaluating how administrative agencies or a particular agency operates in practice.
The challenge for administrative law scholars is thus to re-invent the field and set new priorities as to what type of scholarship can best promote effective administrative decision-making. As discussed in this Article, there is an entire aspect of the administrative state-how administrative agencies operate in practice-that remains relatively unexplored. Going forward, scholars can profitably engage in the important project of investigating this question, comparing the strategies and practices of different agencies (both domestic and foreign ones) and developing both a better understanding of how agencies can and should operate.
The FCC provides an illuminating case study, but a number of other agencies are also ripe for examination. The SEC, for example, appears to have made policy decisions premised on the promise of effective monitoring that never took place. 180 On one view, this decision can be viewed as simply a bad policy decision. Another perspective, however, is to evaluate why the promised monitoring did not take place, whether monitoring behavior after-the-fact is something the agency is able to perform in other contexts, and, if not, what reforms might enable the agency to perform such monitoring. Stated differently, administrative and regulatory law scholarship generally takes the institutional processes used by agencies as a given and evaluates whether the substantive policy decisions or administrative procedures within that constraint. As explained in this Article, an agency's institutional process is not a black box; rather, it is shaped by a series of practices that can be examined, evaluated, and potentially changed.
Moving from institutional practices to institutional structure, the future of administrative law scholarship will need to take seriously questions about whether and when the right strategy is to abolish an agency rather than to reform it. In the case of the FCC, Lawrence Lessig's call for abolition is premised on the theory that "[y]ou can't fix DNA."
181 That theory, however, is not necessarily the case. As demonstrated by the shock to the FTC's system in the 1980s, agencies can radically transform their institutional practices and performance. Moreover, any analysis of whether to abolish an agency must also grapple with the concomitant challenge of building a new institutional culture-a challenge that Lessig plainly ignores.
Finally, addressing questions of institutional mission and culture must also grapple with the sometimes awkward juxtapositions of responsibilities lodged in administrative agencies. The framers of the New Deal Constitution-i.e., those legislators who embraced the notion that agencies could act effectively as a quasi-executive, quasi-legislative, and quasijudicial body-acted on questionable assumptions about how administrative agencies would operate. In particular, they failed to appreciate that the ability to use these different tools sometimes leaves agencies at a loss of how to proceed, leaves them without a fully developed sense of how any of the tools should work, and leads to a lack of focus and follow through in using a particular tool. As former FCC Chair Newton Minow put it with regard to the FCC's failings in this regard, the agency's institutional processes often left it in "a never-never land" that produced only "quasi-solutions."
182 Consequently, a major project for administrative law-albeit one that must be pursued by Congress and the agencies themselves-is when and how agencies should use a particular policymaking tool (e.g., rulemaking, adjudication, or self-regulation).
183

VI. CONCLUSION
The current policymaking tools and apparatus used at the FCC are broken. Rebuilding the agency's culture will require not only the right leaders for a new era, but a systematic re-examination of the agency's institutional processes with an eye towards building a new culture. In this respect, the reshaping of how the agency operates will be equally 181 See Lessig, supra note __. This view, which depicts agency culture as fixed, follows a longstanding and credible depiction of how agencies operate. For an earlier such portrait, see Feller, supra note __, at 654 ("Existing agencies have congenital characteristics which the most heroic efforts cannot change."). 182 Minow, supra note 1, at 146. 183 To be sure, Liz Magill has noted the importance of this largely un-examined issue. In so doing, however, she has taken the approach of traditional administrative law scholarship, viewing it from the perspective of the courts who review administrative regulation. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1415 (2004) (noting that judicial review of this choice is effectively non-existent, as courts tolerate the decision to proceed by a particular strategy "for a good reason, a bad reason, or no detectable reason.").
challenging and important to the substantive issues that the agency will address in the years ahead. To do so, the FCC will need to follow the lead of the FTC, which impressively re-examined and rebuilt its institutional culture over the last 25 years, thereby enabling it to operate much more effectively and to win over the respect of its critics.
For administrative law scholars, examining the institutional process of the FCC as well as other regulatory agencies that suffer similar defects represents a new brand of scholarship and raises a series of questions that are, in effect, the hidden side of the modern administrative state. As discussed in this Article, the design and functioning of regulatory agencies is not one that can be assumed away or viewed as a black box. Rather, such agencies face a series of choices about institutional processes that, while influenced by their structure and culture, can be changed. Thus, those processes-as well as the culture and structure of the agencies themselves-must be critically examined and debated by the academy and policymakers just like the substantive decisions that result from those processes.
